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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation
and growth. We compare a rigid legal system (the law is set before the
technological innovation) and a flexible one (the law is set after ob-
serving the new technology). The flexible system dominates in terms
of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at intermediate
stages of technological development — periods when legal change is
needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technologi-
cal development, when commitment problems are severe. For mature
technologies the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid
legal systems may induce excessive R&D investment.
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1 Introduction
Technology and legal rules are bound to coevolve. Early examples of tech-
nology that impacted the legal system are steamboats and railroads. They
brought up a variety of unprecedented cases and placed novel demands on the
law. Steamboats proved risky because of fires and boiler explosions, leading
eventually to the responsibility for steamboat owners and captains to prove
non negligent behavior in case of litigation (Khan, 2004). Liability rules
were also challenged by railroads because of sparks on crop and incredibly
numerous injuries and fatalities (Ely, 2001).1
We develop here a simple model of endogenous technological change to
study the interaction between legal institutions and innovation. On the one
hand, quality-improving innovation arises randomly and endogenously: the
likelihood is proportional to R&D investments.2 On the other hand, law
makers face a trade-off between providing private firms with the incentives to
invest in research (thus increasing the probability that innovation occurs) and
protecting the public from the externalities arising from the new technologies.
It is key to our analysis that the law that optimally solves the above
trade-off differs according to whether we look at the problem ex-ante (before
R&D investments are chosen) or ex-post (when the R&D investments are
sunk and after uncertainty has been resolved). This is because at the ex-
ante stage the optimal law internalizes the effect on investment decisions –
but does not do so at the ex-post stage.
In this setting we compare two benchmark legal regimes. We consider
first a flexible legal system where the law can be amended ex post, after a
new technology arises. We then consider a rigid regime where the law is
written ex-ante and cannot be subsequently changed. We assume that it
is hard to accurately describe at the ex-ante stage future contingencies. In
the rigid regime the same law has to apply regardless of the technological
environment realized.
1Other technological advances that also drove legal innovation include medicine (e.g., in
vitro fertilization and genetic testing), automobiles, computing, and communication (e.g.,
telegraphy and, more recently, the internet). See Khan (2004) and Friedman (2002) for a
discussion of how the US legal institutions responded to various instances of technological
innovation.
2In the growth literature, quality-improving innovations are known as “vertical” inno-
vations. See the seminal papers by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991). See instead Romer (1987, 1990) for growth models where innovation is horizontal
(i.e., innovators expand the variety of available goods).
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The reason why we focus on this particular distinction is twofold. First,
at least since Posner (1973) flexibility is usually regarded as a key feature
that differentiates Common Law from Civil Law.3 Second, recent empirical
work (namely, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2003) has provided some
evidence that the adaptability of Case Law partly explains some of the ben-
efits of Common Law for financial and other variables.4
The choice between our two legal systems involves a trade-off between
commitment and flexibility. The flexible system does not commit in advance
to any rule and optimally determines, at an ex-post stage, the penalties
associated with the externalities associated with the new technology. The
rigid system, instead, commits ex-ante to a set of penalties for externalities
but in so doing it has to impose the same penalties independently on whether
the technological innovation occurs or not.
More specifically, in our model a lax regulatory standard may be optimal
ex ante because it provides strong incentives to innovate. After innovation
has occurred, however, considerations about safety and health may induce
law-makers to prefer a stricter regulation. In the absence of commitment
on the part of law-makers it then follows that equilibrium R&D investment
would be suboptimally low when viewed from an ex ante perspective. The
rigid regime does not suffer from commitment problems because law-enforcers
are bound to follow the rule that was written ex ante but it might be char-
acterized by inefficiently high externalities.
The trade-off between commitment and flexibility has long been studied in
economics. However, we want to emphasize an important point of distinction
from the rule-versus-discretion literature. This literature usually assumes
that the degree of uncertainty, which is the crucial parameter to evaluate
the trade-off, is exogenous.5 Instead, in this paper the degree of uncertainty
3As argued in Beck and Levine (2005), “legal systems that embrace case law and judicial
discretion tend to adapt more efficiently to changing conditions than legal systems that
adhere rigidly to formalistic procedures and that rely more strictly on judgements based
narrowly on statutory law.”
4Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) construct a measure of adaptability of the
legal system that takes into account whether judicial decisions are based on previous court
decisions and on principles of equity rather than on statutory law. Their measure uses
data from Djankov, La Porta, Lo´pez de Silanes and Shleifer (2003) and La Porta, Lo´pez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004).
5For example, Rogoff (1985) compares rigid targeting systems and flexible monetary
regimes and argues that rigid regimes are preferable if uncertainty about aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks is low. More recently, Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) study the
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(which is related to the speed of technological change) is endogenous (via
R&D investment) and itself determined by the legal environment.
The assumption that the underlying uncertainty is endogenous has im-
portant implications in our model of the rigid regime. For example, consider
the problem of a legislator who has to write a single (non-contingent) law
before knowing whether or not the current technology will be replaced by
a more advanced technology. When the likelihood of discovering the new
technology is either very low or very high, the constraint the legislator faces
in the rigid regime matters less: in either case, the legislator will simply se-
lect the rule that optimally regulates the most likely contingency.6 Since the
probability of replacing the status-quo technology depends on the law that
is selected ex ante and since a rigid system has a comparative advantage in a
certain environment (where the constraint matters less), the legislator has an
incentive to choose a law that reduces the underlying uncertainty in the econ-
omy. In particular, the rigid regime may end up selecting a rule that either
discourages or, more surprisingly, strongly encourages R&D investment. The
result is that the amount of R&D investment in a rigid legal system is either
very low or excessive (greater than first-best). Conversely, overinvestment in
research never occurs when legal institutions are flexible.
Finally, we argue that the terms of the trade-off between commitment
and flexibility are not constant but change over time as technology matures.
Consequently, legal institutions that are appropriate at the early stages of
technological development may no longer be desirable at later stages.
In particular, rigid legal systems are preferable at the early stages of
technological development — these are periods when we expect commitment
problems to arise. Indeed, during the early stages of development of a tech-
nology, one would expect the relative size of (the change in) externalities
to be larger compared to the productivity increase yielded by technological
innovation. For instance, productivity gains may be small when a new tech-
nology is introduced due to adjustment and learning costs. Since investors
correctly foresee that in the flexible regime law-makers will choose strict reg-
ulatory standards ex-post, investment in research might be suboptimally low
and the inefficient technology more likely to survive.
optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in an intertemporal consumption
model with time inconsistent preferences and taste shocks. In both papers the degree of
uncertainty is exogenously given.
6The legislator understands how the law affects the incentives to innovate and knows
the payoff consequences of the law in each technological environment.
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Instead, a flexible legal system dominates (in terms of welfare, amount
of innovation and output growth) in economies at intermediate stages of
technological development. These are periods in which the relative size of
productivity gains and variation in externalities is in the intermediate range,
and hence the (ex-post) optimal laws under the old and under the new tech-
nology may differ a lot. Hence, a single rule is necessarily suboptimal and
flexibility has high value. At the same time, commitment has low value
because the law that provides incentives to innovate is the same one that
law-makers would choose ex post in the new technological environment.
Finally, we show that when technology is mature — variations in exter-
nalities are comparatively small — the two legal systems lead to the same
economic outcomes because neither commitment nor flexibility is particularly
valuable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses
some related literature. In Section 3 we present our model and in Section 4
we characterize the optimal laws in the two legal regimes. Section 5 compares
the rigid and flexible regimes. Section 6 concludes. For ease of exposition all
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, Anderlini, Felli, and Riboni (2011) is the first
paper to analyze time-inconsistency problems in judicial decision making.
That paper considers a model of Case Law in which the judges suffer from
an ex-post temptation to be excessively lenient that stems from the fact that
all economic decisions are sunk by the time the parties go to court. In that
set up, there is a specific role for the rule of precedent (stare decisis).
There is a sequence of cases, considered in turn by a sequence of forward-
looking courts. Precedents, with some probability, bind the decisions of fu-
ture courts, thus mitigating their tendency towards excessive leniency. Since
each court can affect the state of precedents via its current decision, this
creates an incentive for the current court, even though it rules ex-post, to
avoid inefficiently lenient decisions. The thrust of Anderlini, Felli, and Riboni
(2011) is to characterize the optimal trade-off created by these incentives.
Kaplow (1992) is a fundamental and wide-scoped work on the economics
of “rules versus standards” rooted in the scholarly tradition of law. A rule
is a law with an ex-ante prescription (it has ex-ante “content”) while a stan-
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dard only acquires “content” ex-post.7 The back-bone of the analysis in
Kaplow (1992) is the study of the trade-offs that (normatively) drive the
choice between rules and standards as they apply to the economic sphere.
While he explores many variations and extensions of the basic set-up, the
main trade-off he identifies is due to the fact that rules are more expensive
to formulate ex-ante, while standards are more expensive to interpret (and
hence enforce) ex-post. As a result, an important consideration in the choice
of a rule versus a standard is the frequency with which it will be invoked,
and the heterogeneity of the pool of situations to be considered.
Comin and Hobijn (2009) analyze a model of lobbying and technology
adoption and argue that countries where the legislative authorities have more
flexibility, the judicial system is not effective, or the regime is not very demo-
cratic, new technologies replace old technologies more slowly. This happens
because rigidity in lawmaking makes lobbying for protecting the old tech-
nology more difficult. The mechanism that explains why in their paper a
rigid system may favor technological progress relatively to a flexible system
is completely different from ours. In our model, the channel is twofold. First,
flexibility may harm technological progress because of time consistency prob-
lems. This explains why law-makers in a flexible system may choose ex-post
a law that is less favorable to inventors than the one in the first-best solution.
Second, for the reasons explained above rigid systems may choose a law that
is more favorable to investors compared to the first-best solution.
Similarly to this paper, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) argue that
the policies that increase growth in the early stages of development may be
suboptimal at later stages. In particular, they formalize the Gerschenkron’s
(1962) view that relatively backward economies should pursue an investment-
based strategy, which relies on long-term (hence, rigid) relationships between
entrepreneurs and financiers and on a less competitive environment. How-
ever, as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, they argue
that countries should switch to an innovation-based strategy, which requires
more short-term (hence, more flexible) relationships, better selection of firms
and managers and more competitive policies.
Acemoglu, Antra`s, and Helpman (2007) study the relationship between
contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology
adoption. In their model, a firm chooses its technology and investment levels
7As a example, a rule might prescribe that it is forbidden to drive “over 55 miles per
hour,” while a standard would forbid “excessive speed.” See Kaplow (1992), p. 560.
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in contractible activities with suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then
choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payoffs from
an ex post bargaining game. Their paper argues that greater contractual
incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, and that
the impact of contractual incompleteness is more pronounced when there is
greater complementarity among the intermediate inputs.8
Finally, Immordino, Pagano, and Polo (2011) analyze optimal policies
when firms’ research activity leads to innovations that may be socially harm-
ful. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation,
may both thwart the incentives to undertake research and guide the use of
each innovation. In our setting we abstract from the enforcement problem,
and we judge the optimality of a legal system by studying the trade off be-
tween its adaptability to technological change and its capacity to provide
incentives to innovate.
3 The Model
We consider a stylized model of endogenous technological change where in-
novation improves the quality of existing products and makes old products
obsolete. Our economy includes three sectors: the R&D sector, the interme-
diate good sector (which is regulated by the law) and the final good sector.
To keep our setting tractable and focus attention on the interaction be-
tween legal systems and innovation, our model is simplified along various
dimensions: for instance, the input prices in the R&D sector and in the
intermediate good sector are assumed to be exogenously given.
3.1 Technology and Market Structure
The final good is produced competitively using a single intermediate good.
We let i ∈ {0, 1} denote the quality of the intermediate good.
We assume a standard production technology, namely
y (i) = A (i)x (i)
1
2 , (1)
where x (i) is the amount of intermediate good of quality i and A (i) is a
8See also Acemoglu (2009, p. 801) for a discussion of the possibility of a hold-up
problem in technology adoption.
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parameter that measures the productivity of the intermediate good, and y(i)
is total output when the quality of the intermediate good is i.9
The quality of the intermediate good can take two values: i = 0, 1. We
assume that quality 0 is less productive than quality 1: that is, A (1) =
γAA(0), with γA > 1.
Crucially, the intermediate good of quality 1 is available only if inventors
are successful at discovering it. If R&D investment is not successful, only
intermediate good of quality i = 0 is produced. More details about the prob-
ability of successful innovation will be spelled out in Subsection 3.4 below.10
In our model, innovation is drastic. In other words, the final good sector
demands only the most productive technology available.11
The intermediate good is produced by a monopolist using inelastically
supplied labor. Production is regulated by law. Specifically, regulation re-
quires the firm to comply with the law in the use of inputs. As a result,
regulation affects the cost of production.
To keep things tractable, assume that the marginal cost of the interme-
diate good firm is constant and equal to
MC(a) =
1
a
, (2)
where a ∈ [a, a] is an index related to the degree of regulatory strictness
embodied in the law. We assume a > a > 0. For instance, a can be thought
as the inverse of the level of caution required in the production process.
9 Our notation is convenient, but we point out that it contains a slight abuse. While
x(i) indicates quantities of two different physical goods as i ∈ {0, 1} varies, total output
always consists of the same physical final consumption good. Indexing output by i ∈ {0, 1}
is useful in the sequel since it allows us to keep track of differences in output in the two
possible “technological states” that our model allows. Notice also that, from (1), the
output elasticity with respect to x (i) is 1/2. Under this assumption, the indirect utility
of the representative agent in the economy has a very simple form (see Subsection 4.1
below). This will allow us to obtain closed form solutions in the two legal regimes. The
main thrust of our results, however, would not change in a more general specification.
10In Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni (2011) we considered a dynamic extension
of this model where the number of innovations is potentially infinite. Results in the
dynamic model are, however, very similar to the ones discussed here in a simple setting
with only two technological states.
11Innovation is non-drastic if and only if the firm that uses the status-quo technology
can make positive profits when the firm that produces the most advanced technology is
charging the monopolistic price. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992) (Section V) innovations
are drastic if γA is sufficiently high.
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According to this interpretation, when a is high, it means that the firm is
not required to be very cautious and, consequently, its marginal cost is low.12
The price of the intermediate good relatively to the final good is denoted
by p(i).
3.2 Preferences
The utility of the representative agent in this economy is13
u (c(i), a; i) = c(i)− λ (i) a. (3)
Utility depends linearly on the consumption of the final good c(i). Moreover,
we assume that the lack of caution in the production of the intermediate
good generates a negative externality affecting the consumer. Notice that
this externality is reduced if the intermediate good firm is more cautious
(that is, a is low). The severity of the externality depends on the quality of
the intermediate good used in production and is parameterized by λ (i). We
assume that λ (1) = γλλ (0) where γλ > 0. For simplicity, we normalize λ (0)
to 1.14
As a motivation for the preferences in (3) consider the case where the
final good is produced with genetically modified ingredients which may cause
environmental and health externalities. The emissions of sparks and cinder
caused by railroads is another classic example of externality that has been
dealt with by the legal system.15
12We also assume that the law can be perfectly enforced. We abstract from the enforce-
ment issue in the belief that the type of legal regime has little impact on it.
13Indexing consumption by i ∈ {0, 1} is a mild abuse of notation in exactly the same
way as indexing total output. Consumption always consists of the same physical final
consumption good. See footnote 9 above. We proceed in this way since it proves convenient
in what follows.
14If γλ > 1, the consumer faces a more dangerous innovation. In this case, the innovation
makes it more costly for the consumer to have a more permissive legislation. If instead 0 6
γλ < 1, the negative externality from production is less severe under the new technology.
15At the end of the 19th century, for instance, typical allegations of negligence included
the failure to have a functioning spark arrester, to use the appropriate type of fuel, to keep
the roadway free of weeds, or the failure to build fire guards on the edge of the roadway.
See Grady (1988) and Ely (2001) for an account of early cases concerned with these issues.
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3.3 The Maximization Problem of the Intermediate
Good Firm
We denote by Π (a, i) the profit function of the monopolist that produces the
intermediate good of quality i,
Π (a, i) = max
x(i)≥0
[
p(i)− 1
a
]
x (i) , (4)
where a reflects the law enforced in state i. Since the final-good producer is
competitive, the inverse demand of the intermediate good is
p(i) =
1
2
A (i)x (i)−
1
2 . (5)
That is, p(i) is equal to the marginal product of the intermediate good. The
monopolist’s production choice is then
x (i) =
[
A (i) a
4
]2
. (6)
Substituting equation (6) into (4) we obtain
Π (a, i) = aφ(i), (7)
where
φ(i) ≡
[
A (i)
4
]2
. (8)
Clearly, from (7), profits in the intermediate good sector are increasing in a.
3.4 Optimal Investment in Research
The R&D sector includes one firm which chooses the amount of research
investment, denoted by z, aimed at discovering technology 1. When z is the
investment, innovation arrives randomly with probability
Pr {innovation} = ι+ θz, (9)
where ι ∈ [0, 1] and θ ≥ 0.16 With complementary probability, the R&D firm
does not succeed in innovating and technology 0 is not replaced.
16Given ι and θ, z denotes the level of investment such that ι + θz = 1. Throughout,
we assume that z ∈ [0, z].
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The probability of a successful innovation, from equation (9), has two
components: an exogenous component and an endogenous component which
depends on z. In this paper, we focus on two benchmark cases. In Subsection
5.1 below we analyze the case where θ = 0, that is the probability of a
successful innovation is exogenous. In Subsection 5.2 instead, we analyze the
opposite case where ι = 0.
In case R&D investment is successful, the patent of the new technology
is sold to a firm which is willing to produce the intermediate good using
technology 1. We assume that the R&D firm extracts all the surplus: it sells
the patent at a price equal to Π (a, 1).
Research is a costly activity. For tractability, we take the cost to be
quadratic. The R&D firm chooses the amount of research expenditure that
maximizes expected profits. That is, investment in R&D solves
max
z∈[0,z]
(ι+ θz) Π (a, 1)− 1
2
z2. (10)
Assuming an interior solution and using (7) the first-order condition of
problem (10) gives us
z = θaφ(1). (11)
Expression (11) highlights the mechanism through which the law affects the
probability of a successful innovation in our model. A pro-business law (high
a) increases the profits of the intermediate good firm, raises the price of a
patent and makes R&D investment more profitable, thereby increasing the
probability of discovering the more productive technology.17
It is important to notice that in order to determine the optimal amount of
R&D investment what matters is the law the R&D firm expects will prevail
under technology 1. The law that is enforced under the status-quo technology
does not affect the decisions of the R&D firm.18
17The importance of the legal and regulatory frameworks on investment (and innovation)
strongly emerges from the Investment Climate Surveys recently launched by the World
Bank. See Gray (1987) for an empirical analysis of the negative consequences of regulation
on productivity in the US manufacturing industry.
18In principle, the lawmakers could improve the incentives for innovation with R&D sub-
sidies rather than controlling the externality. However, due to informational asymmetries
(with firms knowing payoffs to innovation much more accurately than the Government) it
seems unlikely that subsidies could go all the way in solving the problem. We are grateful
to one of the referees for emphasizing this point to us.
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4 Optimal Laws
In this section we derive the optimal laws (the levels of a) under two different
legal regimes. As discussed above, a can be interpreted as an inverse index
of regulatory strictness embodied in the law. Law-makers are benevolent in
the sense that they choose the law in order to maximize the utility of the
representative consumer. The two legal regimes differ in the timing of the
law-maker’s optimal choice of a. In particular, we distinguish between the
flexible legal regime (denoted by F), where the law-maker chooses a after
observing the technological state i, and the rigid legal regime (denoted by
C), where the law-maker chooses a before observing the technological state i
(and this choice cannot be contingent on i).
4.1 Ex-Post Optimal Laws
Consider, first, the flexible legal regime F . Under this regime the timing is
as follows. First, the R&D firm chooses how much to invest. In making this
choice, it correctly foresees what law-makers will choose ex-post. Investment
is either a success or a failure. Law-makers observe the current technological
state and choose the law. Finally, production and consumption take place.
In order to solve the legislator’s problem we derive the indirect utility of
the representative consumer in each technological environment.
Using (1), (3), (6) and the equilibrium condition c(i) = y (i), we obtain
that the indirect utility in state i is linear in a:
u(a, i) = aϑ(i), (12)
where
ϑ(i) ≡ 1
4
A (i)2 − λ (i) (13)
From (12) an increase of a has two effects on utility. First, it has a direct
(negative) effect due to the externality it creates. The higher λ (i) , the
higher is this effect. Second, a higher a decreases the marginal cost of the
intermediate good producer and increases the production of the final good.
A more pro-business law has then an indirect (and positive) effect on utility
because consumption increases. The higher A(i), the higher the marginal
benefit of increasing a due to this second effect.
12
Throughout the paper we assume that innovation, besides increasing the
productivity of the intermediate good, is welfare-improving.19
Assumption 1 Innovation increases consumer utility: ϑ(1) > ϑ(0).
We let aepi denote the law a ∈ [a, a] that maximizes (12). Throughout the
paper, we refer to aepi as the ex-post optimal law in state i. This is the law
that law-makers would choose ex-post: after the technological environment
i is observed.20
Therefore, in the flexible legal regime law-makers in state i choose aepi .
Any other law would not be sequentially optimal. Using (11), expected
welfare in the flexible regime can then be written as:
WF =
[
θ2φ(1)aep1
]
aep1 ϑ(1) +
[
1− θ2φ(1)aep1
]
aep0 ϑ(0). (14)
Given the linearity of (12), it is straightforward to see that
aepi =
{
a if ϑ(i) > 0,
a if ϑ(i) < 0.
(15)
From (13) notice that the ex-post optimal law will be punitive for the
intermediate good firm (that is, equal to a) when the productivity of the
intermediate good A (i) is relatively low compared to the externality λ (i).
One would expect this configuration of parameters (namely, low productivity
and severe externality) to occur in the early stages of the life cycle of several
technologies.21 As technologies develop, however, we expect productivity to
increase and the negative externality on consumers to matter less. In such a
case, the ex-post optimal law will be a pro-business law (that is, a).
Clearly, from (13), if A (0) is sufficiently low relatively to λ (0), both
ϑ(0) and ϑ(1) are negative. Then, from (15), both aep0 and a
ep
1 are equal to
a. When instead the productivity of the status-quo technology is relatively
19It is possible to show that the result in Proposition 2 is reversed when the innovation
is welfare decreasing.
20As we will see in Section 5, this law not necessarily coincide with the law that law-
makers would choose ex-ante: before observing the technological environment i.
21For instance, it is generally assumed that most general purpose technologies (such as,
steam, electricity, and information technology) deliver low productivity gains immediately
upon their adoption. The presumption is that several adjustment and learning costs may
cause output to initially fall when a general purpose technology arrives. See Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2005).
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high, ϑ(0) and ϑ(1) are both positive and aep0 and a
ep
1 are equal to a. A
feature common to both cases is that the ex-post optimal laws under the two
technologies coincide. Finally, when the starting value of A (0) belongs to an
intermediate range, we have that ϑ(0) is negative but that ϑ(1) is positive.
The ex-post optimal law before and after technological change differ and
aep0 = a while a
ep
1 = a.
We can, therefore, postulate the following classification.
Definition 1 Technology is at an early stage of development when ϑ(0) <
ϑ(1) < 0. This occurs when the productivity of the status-quo technology is
sufficiently low:
A(0) <
2
√
γλ
γA
. (16)
Technology is at an intermediate stage of development when ϑ(1) > 0 > ϑ(0)
or, equivalently, when
2
√
γλ
γA
6 A(0) < 2. (17)
Finally, technology is mature when ϑ(1) > ϑ(0) > 0. This occurs when
A(0) > 2. (18)
It is then immediate to verify that at an early stage aep0 = a
ep
1 = a. This
implies that at this stage of technological development the ex-post optimal
law under technology 1 provides weak incentives to invest in R&D. We inter-
pret this as a situation where commitment problems are potentially severe.
At an intermediate stage we have instead aep0 = a and a
ep
1 = a. Finally, at an
advanced stage, aep0 = a
ep
1 = a.
4.2 Ex-Ante Optimal Law
Consider next the rigid regime C. In this regime the law is chosen ex-ante
before observing the technological state i. As mentioned above, we crucially
assume that in the rigid regime, the law cannot be made contingent on the
technological environment. This is because at the ex-ante stage the two
environments are impossible to describe in their full details.22 Let aC denote
the law that will be enforced under both technologies in the C regime.
22However, as is standard in the incomplete contracting literature (e.g., Grossman and
Hart, 1986, and Hart and Moore, 1990), we also assume that law-makers understand how
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The timing is then the following. First, the legislator chooses a single
law in order to maximize the expected utility of the representative agent. In
other words, aC is the solution to the following problem:
max
a∈[a,a]
[
θ2φ(1)a
]
aϑ(1) +
[
1− θ2φ(1)a] aϑ(0). (19)
After aC is selected, the R&D firm chooses the investment level. Invest-
ment results either in a success or a failure. Regardless of the current state
of the technology, law-makers are bound to enforce ex-post the law that was
chosen ex-ante. Therefore, the intermediate good firm exerts caution in the
choice of the amount aC. Finally, the production of the intermediate good
and of the final good take place.
In contrast to the flexible regime, from (19), ex-ante the law has an ad-
ditional effect on consumers’ utility, besides the ones discussed in Subsection
4.1, since it affects the probabilities of the two technological states. This
is why the ex ante optimal law may not coincide with the law that law-
makers would choose ex-post, when R&D investment has been chosen and
the uncertainty about the technology has been resolved.
The expected welfare in the rigid regime is then
WC =
[
θ2φ(1)aC
]
aCϑ(1) +
[
1− θ2φ(1)aC
]
aCϑ(0). (20)
5 Commitment vs. Flexibility
In general, and for different reasons, the two legal systems that we have
just described are both bounded away from efficiency. On the one hand,
the flexible regime is adaptable but it lacks commitment. As a result, it
may not provide sufficient incentives to innovate. On the other hand, in
the rigid regime the law-maker is able to commit but is bound to choose a
single law and, consequently, he cannot adapt to changing conditions. The
incompleteness of the law is then the source of inefficiency of the rigid regime.
In this section we compare our two legal regimes. We do this under two
distinct assumptions on the probability of a successful innovation.
the law affects the probability of successful innovation and know the payoff consequences
of the law in the two technological states. For a model of an event that is not describable
but fully understood by the parties involved ex-ante see Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli
(2006).
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5.1 Exogenous Innovation
Consider, first, the benchmark case where θ = 0. Since the probability of
successful innovation is not affected by z, the solution to problem (10) is
obviously to choose z = 0. Using (9) the probability that innovation occurs
is then exogenously given and equal to ι.
Since the law cannot provide incentives to innovate, legal systems differ
only with respect to their ability to choose the best law for each technol-
ogy. Given this premise, it is entirely straightforward to conclude that when
innovation is exogenous the flexible regime weakly dominates the rigid one.
Proposition 1 (Exogenous Innovation) Suppose that θ = 0 so that in-
novation is entirely exogenous. Then,
(i) When technology is either at an early stage or is mature, the flexible and
rigid regimes achieve the same welfare.
(ii) When instead technology is at an intermediate stage, the flexible regime
weakly dominates the rigid one.
The first statement of Proposition 1 is straightforward. The two regimes
achieve equivalent welfare levels when the ex-post optimal laws are the same
under both technologies.23 This occurs because the incompleteness con-
straint, which forces the legislator in the rigid regime to choose a single law
for both states, is not binding.
The second statement of Proposition 1 follows directly from the compu-
tation of WF and WC when technology is at an intermediate stage.
Knowing that in the flexible regime law-makers choose the ex-post opti-
mal laws as in (15), we have
WF = ιaϑ(1) + (1− ι)aϑ(0). (21)
Consider now the rigid regime. The legislator chooses a (resp. a) when ι
is below (resp. above) a given threshold
ι =
(a− a)ϑ(0)
(a− a) (ϑ(1)− ϑ(0)) . (22)
23From Definition 1, this possibility arises when the economy is either at an early or at
an advanced stage of development.
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Indeed, the legislator must choose a single (non-contingent) law. Therefore,
the chosen law is the one that better regulates technology 0 if and only if
successful innovation is not very likely. We then obtain
WC =
{
ιaϑ(1) + (1− ι)aϑ(0) if ι 6 ι
ιaϑ(1) + (1− ι)aϑ(0) otherwise. (23)
In Figure 1 below, we draw (21) and (23). BothWF andWC are increasing
in ι by Assumption 1. Moreover, WC has a kink at ι. It is important to
notice that the welfare loss of the rigid regime vis-a`-vis the flexible regime
is zero when there is no uncertainty. Conversely, for intermediate values
of ι it is relatively more costly to have an non-contingent law. In other
terms, in this region of parameters the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the incompleteness constraint is high.
[Figure 1]
5.2 Endogenous Innovation
We now consider the case in which the probability of a successful innovation
is fully endogenous: that is, θ > 0 and ι = 0. When θ > 0, the optimal
amount of R&D investment is positive and is endogenous to the model. Since
investment now depends on the law, credibility problems potentially arise.
This is because at the ex-ante stage law-makers do take into account the
effect of the law on the incentives to invest — see (11) above — but do not
do so at the ex-post stage.
An implication of our analysis is that the legislator in the rigid regime may
have an incentive to select a rule that reduces the underlying uncertainty in
the economy. As shown below, this result can be achieved by either strongly
encouraging or strongly discouraging R&D investment.
From (19), the optimal law in the rigid regime aC solves
max
a∈[a,a]
ϑ (0) a+ θ2φ(1)a2 [ϑ (1)− ϑ (0)] . (24)
Since by Assumption 1 we have ϑ (1) − ϑ (0) > 0, the objective function is
convex in the law. This implies that (24) yields a bang-bang solution: the
chosen law aC is either a or a. As a result, the probability of discovering
the new technology is either the lowest or the highest possible one. More
precisely, we obtain
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aC =
 a if
ϑ (0)
ϑ (1)− ϑ (0) + θ
2φ(1) (a+ a) > 0,
a otherwise.
(25)
We can now identify the optimal law chosen by the legislator in each of
the three stages of technological development.
Mature stage. Recall that in the mature stage the parameters are such
that ϑ (0) and ϑ (1) are both positive, using (25), we then obtain aC = a.
This result is intuitive: selecting law a provides the right incentive to conduct
research and, at the same time, it optimally regulates the two technological
environments we may observe ex post.
Intermediate Stage. When technology is at an intermediate stage, the
law that fosters innovation, namely a, is ex-post optimal when innovation is
successful but is suboptimal when innovation is not successful. From (25),
the legislator chooses a when the difference between ϑ (1) and ϑ (0) is small
and, consequently, it is not valuable to provide incentives to innovate. Law
a is also selected when ϑ (0) is extremely low. In this case, it would be
very costly to enforce a in case innovation does not succeed. Finally, if the
probability of a successful innovation can be made sufficiently close to 1 (that
is, θ and φ(i) are high), then the choice a dominates.
[Figure 2]
Early Stage. In this environment providing incentives to conduct research
(choosing a) is suboptimal when R&D investment fails but also when it suc-
ceeds. However, (25) implies that in some cases the legislator does select a.
To understand why consider Figure 2 above. It depicts the indirect utility of
the representative consumer – see definition (12) above – for both technolog-
ical states. Given that at this stage ϑ(0) and ϑ(1) are negative, both indirect
utilities are decreasing in a. Points A and B (resp. points C and D) identify
the agent’s utility associated to law a (resp. a) in state 1 and 0.24 Since at
an early stage we have that in both states law a is ex-post optimal, from a
welfare view point A dominates C and B dominates D. However, to see why
the legislator may sometimes choose a notice that the weights in the ex-ante
utility (20) are endogenous. When the choice of a raises the probability of
state 1 by a considerable amount, the weighted sum of A and B may be
smaller than the weighted sum of C and D.
24That is, A = (a, ϑ(1)), B = (a, ϑ(0)), C = (a, ϑ(1)) and D = (a, ϑ(0)).
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Finally, looking at Figure 2 again, notice that providing incentives to
innovate (that is, choosing law a) is particularly inefficient when innovation
does not occur. This explains why the objective function in (24) is convex in
the law and, as a result, the legislator in the rigid regime may either strongly
encourage or strongly discourage R&D investment.
We are now ready to compare the two legal institutions. Proposition 2
below establishes that, in contrast to Section 5.1, when R&D investment is
endogenous the flexible regime is not necessarily optimal in all cases.
In particular, when technology is at an early stage we have that the rigid
regime may actually dominate the flexible regime because of its ability to
provide better incentives to innovate. Indeed, at an early stage of technolog-
ical development the flexible regime selects a law that protects public safety
and provides weak incentives to innovate. By choosing aC = a the legislator
in the rigid regime can achieve the same welfare that is obtained in the flex-
ible regime. However, in the rigid regime it is also possible to commit to a
law greater than a in order to provide incentives to innovate. This possibility
is not available in the flexible regime and this explains why the commitment
regime weakly dominates the flexible one.
When technology is mature, the two systems yield the same outcomes.
This is because at this stage the ex-post optimal law is the same under both
states (hence flexibility is not valued) and is equal to a (hence, commitment
is equally not valued). Finally, in economies at intermediate stages of devel-
opment — periods when legal change is needed and there are no commitment
problems — the flexible regime is strictly better than the rigid one because
of its ability to penalize externalities if innovation fails.
We conclude by computing the rate of output growth. Recall that with
probability 1−θz, where z is given in (11), the R&D firm fails to innovate and
the rate of output growth is equal to zero. With complementary probability,
the growth rate of output is
g =
[
y (1)− y (0)
y (0)
]
. (26)
Let E(gi), with i = F , C, denote the expected rate of output growth under
legal regime i. Using (1), (6), (11) and (26) we obtain
E(gC) =
(
γ2A − 1
)
θ2φ(1)aC (27)
and
E(gF) = (γ2A
aep1
aep0
− 1)θ2φ(1)aep1 . (28)
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The following proposition summarizes our main result.25
Proposition 2 (Endogenous Innovation) Suppose that ι = 0 and θ > 0,
so that innovation is entirely endogenous. Then,
(i) When technology is at an early stage of development, we have that
WC > WF , E(gC) > E(gF).
(ii) When technology is at an intermediate stage of development, we have
that
WC < WF , E(gC) < E(gF).
(iii) When technology is mature, we have that
WC = WF , E(gC) = E(gF).
It is natural to ask what happens if Proposition 2 is taken to the data.
Of course, we can take the assertions of Proposition 2 either as normative
prescriptions or as positive predictions. In the former case, if reality does
not correspond to the “optimal regime” identified by Proposition 2, then it
yields a policy prescription. If on the other hand we think of Proposition 2
as a positive prediction tool, a discrepancy between reality and the “optimal
regime” should be considered an indictment of the model.
Our position is that, as in many other instances, our model is too simple
to be considered a positive prediction tool, and hence the normative flavor
of Proposition 2 is what takes precedence in our view.
An empirical investigation is clearly beyond the scope of the present pa-
per. However, we pause to point out that such an empirical analysis would
have to overcome several challenging obstacles. To begin with, one would
need cross-country historical data on technological innovation. Moreover, in
order to empirically distinguish among the three stages of technological devel-
opment envisaged here, one would need measures of (possibly, industry-level)
25While we strongly believe that innovations are generally welfare increasing, it is pos-
sible to show that our main result in Proposition 2 is reversed when the innovation is
welfare decreasing. Specifically, (i) when technology is at an early stage of development,
we have that WF = WC ; (ii) when technology is at an intermediate stage of development,
we have that WF > WC ; (iii) when technology is mature, we have that WC ≥ WF (the
proof is available upon request).
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productivity and also measures of the relative size of externalities versus pro-
ductivity gains caused by technological innovation.26
5.3 Rigidity and Overinvestment
We now derive the optimal law in the first-best environment. Similarly to the
flexible regime, the first-best law specifies a law for each state and, similarly
to the rigid regime, the first-best law is specified at the ex ante stage under
full commitment. Let ai denote the law in state i = 0, 1. The first-best
solution, denoted by (afb0 , a
fb
1 ), solves
max
a0,a1∈[a,a]
[
θ2φ(1)a1
]
a1ϑ(1) +
[
1− θ2φ(1)a1
]
a0ϑ(0). (29)
To compute afb0 notice that a0 does not affect the amount of R&D invest-
ment. Then, we easily obtain
afb0 =
{
a if ϑ(0) ≥ 0,
a if ϑ(0) < 0.
(30)
We now derive afb1 . It is immediate to verify that when technology is
either at an intermediate or mature stage, afb1 = a. When instead technology
is at an early stage the objective function in (29) is concave in a1. Specifically,
we obtain
afb1 =

a if 2aϑ(1)− aϑ(0) ≥ 0,
a if 2ϑ(1)− ϑ(0) ≤ 0,
(a ϑ(0))/(2ϑ(1)) otherwise.
(31)
How does the amount of R&D investment in the rigid regime compare
to the one in the first-best? As we anticipated, in the rigid legal regime we
may have either overinvestment or underinvestment in R&D compared to the
first-best.27
26A useful starting point might be the dataset on technology adoption compiled by
Comin and Hobijin (2004). They classify technologies according to whether they have a
previous competing technology. Whether or not a technology has a predecessor that may
be related to its stage of development.
27From (11) note that we have overinvestment (resp. underinvestment) in R&D when
aC = a while a
fb
1 < a (resp. aC = a while a
fb
1 > a). Usually, the literature on incomplete
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Proposition 3 (Underinvestment and Overinvestment) The amount of
R&D investment in the flexible regime is always smaller than or equal to the
first-best amount. In the early stage of technological development, economies
adopting the rigid regime may invest more than first-best.
To understand why at the early stage we may observe overinvestment, no-
tice that two distinct forces push the legislator in the rigid regime to choose a
pro-business law: the implied increase in the probability of a welfare improv-
ing innovation and the implied reduction in the probability of a status-quo
technology subject to inefficient regulation. Indeed, at an early stage of de-
velopment a high value of a is always ex post suboptimal but is relatively
more inefficient under the old than under the new technology (see Figure 2
above). In the first-best world, the second force is absent since the law is
state-contingent and, hence, it is possible to optimally regulate the status-quo
technology. This is why the rigid legal system may trigger overinvestment
in R&D. Finally, notice that when technology is not at an early stage of
development (hence, ϑ(1) > 0) we obtained afb1 = a. Then, it is not possible
to observe aC > a
fb
1 .
At first glance, it may seem paradoxical that the probability of a welfare
improving innovation in the rigid regime may be inefficiently high. However,
recall that welfare depends on the consumption of the final good but also
on the externality. A large investment in R&D may be suboptimal when
it is obtained by committing to a high a, which implies a high level of the
externality generated in the intermediate good sector.
Comparing (15) with (30) and (31), it is immediate to see that in the
flexible legal regime R&D investment is never inefficiently high.
5.4 Costly Change of the Law
We now consider a partially rigid regime where the law can be changed ex
post by incurring a strictly positive cost κ. Let W (κ) denote optimal welfare
in this regime. Clearly, W (∞) = WC and W (0) = WF where WC and WF
have been defined in (20) and (14) above, respectively.
contracts has focused on the possibility of underinvestment due to ex-post exploitation
(see Grout, 1984). The overinvestment result is also obtained in the incomplete contract
literature: see for instance, Chung (1995). The underlying reason is different from ours: in
that literature, some parties may overinvest to strategically affect their bargaining power
ex-post.
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The timing is as follows. The legislator, in the partial commitment
regime, selects a single law, denoted by aPC. The R&D firm chooses the
amount of research investment. In making this decision the R&D firm un-
derstands the legislator’s incentives to change the law ex-post and choose aepi
in state i. After knowing whether or not R&D investment was successful,
the legislator decides whether to enforce the existing law aPC or to change it
by incurring the cost κ. Given that state i is realized, the legislator changes
the law if and only if
ϑ (i) aPC 6 −κ+ ϑ (i) aepi . (32)
Finally, production and consumption take place.
The following result analyzes welfare in the regime with partial commit-
ment.
Proposition 4 (Costly Change) Let any κ > 0 be given. Then,
(i) When technology is at an early stage of development, we have that
W (κ) > WF .
(ii) When technology is at an intermediate stage of development, we have
that
WC ≤ W (κ) < WF .
(iii) When technology is mature, we have that
W (κ) = WC = WF .
The possibility of changing the law ex post is useless when the technology
is at an advanced stage of development. When technology is at an interme-
diate stage of development, flexibility is needed and a pro-business law is
also credible. It is then preferable to have a low κ. As long as κ is strictly
positive, however, the flexible regime remains superior. In an early stage of
development, the partially rigid regime dominates the flexible regime because
it has the possibility of reproducing the flexible regime (by choosing a) and,
at the same time, it allows some (limited) commitment.
Before concluding this section, it is interesting to note that at an early
stage of technological development, partial commitment (0 < κ <∞) is – at
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least for some parameter values – strictly preferable to having full commit-
ment (κ =∞) or full flexibility (κ = 0).
To understand why this is the case, assume that in the commitment
regime the parameters in (25) are such that the optimal law in the fully rigid
regime is a. Moreover, choose a κ that satisfies the following two inequalities:
ϑ (0) a < −κ+ ϑ (0) a, (33)
ϑ (1) a > −κ+ ϑ (1) a. (34)
Referring to Figure 2 above, it is easy to see that such a κ always exists.28
Notice from (34) that our partially rigid regime provides credible incentives
to innovate since a is not changed ex-post in state 1. Moreover, given that κ
satisfies (33), the law a will be changed ex-post in the case the technological
innovation fails. This indicates that an intermediate value of k satisfying
(33) and (34) provides flexibility (at a cost) and also commitment.
5.5 Common Law vs Civil Law
Throughout this paper, we have focused on two stylized (and abstract) legal
regimes. As discussed in the Introduction the motivation behind the choice
of these regimes, however, is the important comparison between Civil and
Common Law, the two major legal traditions of the western world.29
The parallel is tempting since flexibility is regarded by many as a key
feature that differentiates the Common Law from Civil Law.30
According to traditional comparative law doctrine, Civil law is a codified
system, where the role of Courts is to apply a written body of statutes which
can only be amended by the legislature. Since the process of legislative
amendment is necessarily slow, this may result in the Civil law being at least
partially rigid.
By contrast, Common Law is mostly a judge-made law. That is, the law
is, at least in part, established by judicial precedents and decisions. Since
28This is because B −D > A− C.
29A large and influential body of empirical literature known as “Law and Finance” ex-
amines the relative performance of Common and Civil Law on various economic outcomes.
See the survey of La Porta, Lo´pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
30Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) challenge the view that Common Law is more flexible
and show that US Law during the nineteenth century was neither more flexible nor more
responsive than French law to the businesses needs.
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courts are afforded with greater discretion, law may then evolve gradually
and incrementally as judges extend and adapt existing legal principles to new
circumstances.
Therefore, we would like to interpret the comparison presented above as a
way to identify the forces at play when considering technological innovations
under a Common Law, respectively a Civil Law, legal system.
Before concluding this section, two caveats bear mentioning. First, under
Common Law the body of statutes has expanded dramatically through time
(Calabresi, 1982) and, at the same time, the latitude of civil-law judges in
interpreting the statutes has increased (Merryman, 1985). The convergence
between the two legal traditions makes “pure” forms of either system hard to
identify. Second, in modeling the flexible legal regime we abstract from the
precedent-setting value of current decisions, a feature of Common Law. One
justification for this omission is that the rule of precedent does not generally
apply to regulatory agencies, which deal with many of the legal challenges
brought up by technological change. In the US this was established by an
important Supreme Court decision which ruled that an agency may change its
previous interpretation of an ambiguous statute without settling the statute’s
meaning.31
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether a flexible legal system is preferable to a rigid
system in keeping up with technological progress. To answer this question we
developed a simple model of endogenous technological change where innova-
tions are vertical (new products provide greater quality and replace existing
ones) and we analyze the two legal regimes.
We argue that the comparison between the two legal institutions involves
a trade-off between commitment and flexibility. In this paper, this trade-off
is far from simple since the degree of uncertainty, which is a key parameter
in the comparison, is not exogenous, as in the rules-versus-discretion litera-
ture, but depends on R&D firms’ investment decisions, which are themselves
determined by the legal institution.
31“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. [...] On the con-
trary, the agency must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on
a continuing basis, for example, in response to changed factual circumstances.” (Chevron
vs Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 1984).
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In the context of our model, we show that rigid legal systems are prefer-
able (in terms of welfare and rate of output growth) in the early stages of
technological development. Flexible legal systems are, instead, preferable
at intermediate stages of development: output grows faster and welfare is
greater. Finally, when technology is mature, the two legal systems are equiv-
alent.
The amount of innovation in the rigid regime may be either inefficiently
low or, under some conditions, inefficiently high.
The welfare comparison summarized above holds even when we assume
that in the rigid legal system the statute (or regulation) can be changed
ex-post at a cost.
In our view, the analysis above sheds light on how technological inno-
vation is shaped by a system of Common Law, as opposed to a Civil Law
one.
A natural question would be how our conclusions would change in an
economy where R&D investment increases the variety of available goods (for
instance as in Romer, 1990). Various results obtained in the current setting
would likely survive. However, we expect the legislator in a rigid regime
(where the law is not contingent on each variety) to discourage innovation,
but not to induce overinvestment. Indeed, contrary to our conclusions, hori-
zontal innovations always increase the complexity of the economy since new
varieties coexist with old varieties. Therefore, the legislator in the rigid
regime would likely have a bias against such innovations. Everything else
being equal, we expect the rigid regime to grow at a slower pace than in the
setting we have analyzed here.
Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
Giovanni Immordino (Universita` di Salerno)
Alessandro Riboni (E´cole Polytechnique and Universite´ de Montre´al)
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
There are three cases to consider.
i) When technology is at an early stage of development, using (15) we
obtain that the ex-post optimal law is a in both states so that the flexible
regime provides weak incentives to innovate. Since the rigid regime can
replicate the flexible one by choosing aC = a and since the rigid regime can
also choose aC = a, it must be that WC > WF and E(gC) > E(gF).
ii) Suppose now that technology is at an intermediate stage of develop-
ment. In the flexible regime, from (15) we conclude that the law enforced in
state 1 (resp. 0) is a (resp. a). In the rigid regime, as shown in (25), two
cases are possible: aC is either a or a. First, assume that aC = a. Given (11),
this implies that the probability that state 1 occurs in the rigid regime is lower
than in the flexible one. Using (27) and (28) we have that E(gF) > E(gC).
Moreover, when aC = a it is possible to show that WF > WC. This is be-
cause a does not maximize the indirect utility in state 1 and because state 1
(which by Assumption 1 provides greater utility than state 0) is more likely
in the flexible regime. Second, assume that aC = a. Plugging the ex-post
optimal laws and aC = a into (28) and (27), we obtain that E(gF) > E(gC).
To show that WF > WC first notice that when aC = a, the probability that
state 1 occurs in the two regimes is the same. Moreover, recall that in (11)
we assumed an interior solution for R&D investment. Then, the probability
that state 0 occurs is strictly positive. Since a does not maximize u(a, 0), we
conclude that also when aC = a we have WF > WC.
iii) Using Definition 1, when technology is mature we have that ϑ (0) > 0
and ϑ (1) > 0. In the flexible regime, we know from (15) that law-makers
select a in both states. In the rigid regime, from (25) we conclude that
aC = a. This implies that welfare in the two regimes is the same and, using
(27) and (28), that E(gC) = E(gF).
Proof of Proposition 3
To be able to show, using (11), that R&D investment in the flexible regime
cannot be larger than the one under the first-best law, we must show that
aep1 6 afb1 . Two cases are possible: ϑ (1) > 0 and ϑ (1) < 0. First, when
ϑ (1) > 0 in the flexible regime as well as under the first-best law we have –
using (30), (31) and (15) – that the law for the more advanced technology
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is equal to a, so that investment in the flexible regime is identical to the
first-best level. When ϑ (1) < 0, from (15) we obtain that law-makers in the
flexible regime choose a. Therefore, the amount of R&D investment under
the first-best is necessarily (weakly) greater than in the flexible regime.
In order to prove that the commitment regime may induce overinvestment
in research, we must show that there exists a region of parameter values where
aC = a and a
fb
1 < a. First, assume that parameters are such that ϑ(1) < 0.
(When ϑ(1) > 0 innovation in the first-best is already at the maximum level
and the commitment regime can at most grow at the same rate). Consider
the following parameter values: take a = 1 and θ2φ(1) = 1 so that if the law
is a, state 1 occurs with probability one. In this case, we have
WC = max
a∈[a,a]
(1− a)ϑ (0) a+ aϑ (1) a. (35)
Using (25), one can show that the law in the rigid regime is 1 if
a >
ϑ (1)
ϑ (0)− ϑ (1) . (36)
Using (30) and (31) we know that when ϑ(1) < 0 we have that afb(1) < 1 if
and only if
a <
2ϑ (1)
ϑ(0)
. (37)
One can verify that when ϑ (0) < 2ϑ (1) it is possible to find a value for
a, with 0 < a < 1, such that both (36) and (37) are satisfied, which proves
our claim that at least for some parameter values the rigid regime induces
overinvestment. Notice that since (36) and (37) are strict inequalities, our
claim remains true when θ2φ(1) is sufficiently close to one so that, as we
assumed in the paper, the probability of state 1 is strictly lower than one.
Proof of Proposition 4
There are three cases to consider.
i) When technology is at an early stage of development, the ex-post opti-
mal law is always a so that the flexible regime does not provide any incentive
to innovate. The partially rigid regime, on the contrary, can choose to pro-
vide incentives. Therefore, exactly as in case i) of Proposition 2, the rigid
regime could replicate the flexible one by picking a, so that it must be the
case that WC > WF .
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ii) Suppose now that technology is at an intermediate stage of develop-
ment. We first show that for all κ > 0 we have W (κ) < WF . To see this,
notice, from (30) and (31), that the laws in the flexible regime coincide with
the first-best law. Then, it is immediate that W (κ) ≤ WF . To show that
W (κ) < WF , notice that in the partially rigid regime two cases are possible:
aPC is either changed or not changed ex-post. First, assume that aPC is not
changed. In this case, in the partially rigid regime a single law is enforced un-
der both states. Since the probability of innovation is assumed to be strictly
below one and since at this stage the ex-post optimal laws are different in
the two states, with strictly positive probability the partially rigid regime
enforces a law that is not ex-post optimal. Then, W (κ) < WF . Second, as-
sume that aPC is changed ex-post. Since the cost k is incurred, we obviously
have W (κ) < WF .
To show that WC ≤ W (κ), recall, from (25), that in the rigid regime the
law is either a or a. First, suppose that the rigid regimes chooses a. To show
that WC ≤ W (κ), notice that if aPC = a, welfare in the partially rigid regime
would be weakly greater than in the fully rigid regime. To see this, first
notice that if innovation does not occur, welfare in the two regimes would
be identical. However, if the new technology is discovered the legislator in
the partially rigid regime has the possibility of changing the law to a after
paying a cost. It follows that in the partially rigid regime the probability of
innovation and welfare in state 1 are weakly greater than in the rigid one.
We can, therefore, argue that WC ≤ W (κ). Second, assume that the rigid
regime chooses a. Notice that in the partially rigid regime we could achieve
a higher welfare by choosing a as aPC. Indeed, the probability of innovation
as well as the indirect utility in state 1 would be the same under the two
regimes. However, if R&D investment does not succeed (an event occurring
with strictly positive probability), welfare in state 0 would be weakly greater
under the partially rigid regime since the legislator has the option to change
the law ex-post and choose a. As a result, we have that WC ≤ W (κ).
iii) When the technology is mature, A(0) > 2, using Definition 1, it is
immediate to verify that the law aPC in the partially rigid regime is equal to a
for all κ. Moreover, for i = 0, 1 we have that aPC is ex-post optimal. Welfare
in the rigid regime does not depend on κ since the law is never changed
ex-post. Then we have that W (κ) = WC = WF for all κ.
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